The Kill Chain and The Brave New War

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The Future of War is Decentralized

Christian Brose's The Kill Chain fits into John Robb's Brave New War worldview through a shared recognition of how modern warfare is increasingly defined by technology, decentralization, and the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. Both authors articulate how traditional military doctrines and approaches are becoming obsolete in the face of rapidly evolving threats that leverage technology and asymmetric tactics.

In The Kill Chain, Brose emphasizes that the U.S. military must transition from an outdated model of warfare, which relies on heavy, centralized, and hierarchical systems, to one that is networked, decentralized, and automated. This is in direct alignment with Robb’s view of modern conflict, where networked actors—whether state or non-state—exploit the interconnectedness of global systems to disrupt, degrade, and destabilize powerful adversaries. Robb describes how global guerrillas use these networks to operate in small, autonomous groups, bypassing traditional state hierarchies to attack vulnerable infrastructure.

Brose and Robb both argue that the future of conflict is not about large, conventional forces clashing head-on. Instead, it’s about how fast and effectively forces can operate within a distributed, digital network that connects sensors, decision-makers, and weapons systems. Brose’s kill chain is a system designed to integrate these capabilities at speed, while Robb’s global guerrillas are adept at targeting the weak links in such systems to bring them down.

From Robb’s worldview, the ability of non-state actors and smaller forces to act quickly, adaptively, and asymmetrically is key. Brose, too, is concerned with the speed of decision-making and action in military operations. He emphasizes the need to automate parts of the kill chain with AI and autonomous systems to match the speed of modern threats, which aligns with Robb’s emphasis on networked, fast-moving actors who can outmaneuver larger, slower bureaucratic systems.

Robb’s systems disruption theory is central to Brave New War. It argues that future wars will be less about physical destruction and more about disrupting the complex, interconnected systems that modern states and societies depend on. In Robb’s view, global guerrillas don’t need to defeat a state militarily; they only need to disrupt the systems that allow the state to function i.e. power grids, communication networks, and financial systems. This strategy of targeting critical infrastructure with minimal resources is designed to create cascading failures, causing widespread chaos and undermining state power.

The Kill Chain echoes this vulnerability. Brose argues that the U.S. military’s overreliance on large, centralized systems, such as aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets—makes it highly susceptible to disruption. Adversaries like China and Russia have focused on developing systems designed to disable or disrupt these legacy platforms by attacking their command-and-control infrastructure, sensors, and communications; the kinds of targets Robb’s global guerrillas would aim for in a conflict.

Both Brose and Robb emphasize the growing importance of cyber warfare as the key tool for systems disruption. For Robb, cyberattacks are the ultimate non-kinetic fires ( a term that suck with me after reading The Kill Chain) or a way for small, decentralized actors to create massive effects on a technologically advanced adversary by attacking the digital infrastructure that underpins its military and civilian systems. Brose describes how adversaries can exploit U.S. military vulnerabilities with cyberattacks, jamming sensors, blinding satellites, or injecting false data into decision-making systems, effectively breaking the kill chain before it can even begin.

Robb’s Brave New War is built around the idea of asymmetric warfare, where smaller, less powerful actors can challenge larger states by using unconventional tactics and low-cost, high-impact attacks. He also introduces the concept of open-source warfare, where tactics, techniques, and technologies are shared across decentralized networks of non-state actors, enabling them to rapidly innovate and adapt.

Brose’s The Kill Chain acknowledges this asymmetric threat but from the perspective of state-on-state conflict. He describes how China and Russia, instead of trying to match the U.S. militarily with traditional platforms, have adopted asymmetric strategies that focus on neutralizing America’s strengths. These adversaries invest in capabilities designed to disable U.S. power projection by attacking weak points in its command-and-control infrastructure, electronic warfare, and space-based assets. Brose’s warnings about this shift align with Robb’s vision of how smaller or less-resourced actors can use asymmetric tactics to outmaneuver and disrupt a more powerful adversary.

Additionally, Robb’s idea of open-source insurgency ties directly into the nature of cyber warfare, which Brose sees as critical in future conflicts. In Robb’s framework, tools for systems disruption, like cyber exploits, can be shared across a global network of actors, allowing even small groups to gain access to powerful technologies that can cripple a state’s infrastructure. Brose’s analysis echoes this by highlighting how easily cyber tools can be developed or acquired by both state and non-state actors, further amplifying the asymmetric potential of modern warfare.

Both Robb and Brose agree that the U.S. military must adapt if it hopes to remain competitive in the future of warfare. For Brose, this means breaking away from the obsession with legacy systems like aircraft carriers and embracing new technologies like artificial intelligence, automation, and space-based surveillance. He advocates for the U.S. military to move towards a distributed, networked system of warfare where the kill chain is automated and decisions are made at machine speed.

Robb’s prescription for surviving in this new environment is similar. He advocates for a more resilient, decentralized system, where the state adopts the same kind of adaptive, networked thinking that its adversaries use. For both authors, the future is about speed, agility, and flexibility, not overwhelming firepower or centralized control. In Robb’s world, the state that can out-think and out-adapt its adversaries will survive, while the one that clings to legacy platforms will be left vulnerable to systems disruption and decentralized attacks.

In Robb’s framework, non-state actors like global guerrillas use open-source tactics and systems disruption to paralyze more powerful adversaries, a strategy that is echoed in Brose’s analysis of how China and Russia are developing asymmetric capabilities to disable the U.S. military’s kill chain. Both authors warn that the future of warfare will be determined not by who has the most firepower, but by who can best adapt to the challenges of this networked, decentralized, and technology-driven world.