Unfortunately, scammers are everywhere these days, and they’re constantly finding new ways to manipulate people. It could be a fake charity asking for donations or a romantic interest trying to pull at your heartstrings, their tactics are designed to trick you into trusting them. It’s easy to think, “That won’t happen to me,” but it can happen to anyone. My great aunt, for instance, lost $45,000 to a charity scam because she genuinely believed she was helping build a church in Ghana. It wasn’t until she tried to wire another $100,000 that a banker noticed something was wrong and stepped in.

Scammers exploit trust, emotion, and often our personal interests (OPSEC OPSEC OPSEC). Take, for example, my college roommate who almost got conned while selling a laptop on Craigslist. She was contacted by someone claiming they needed the laptop for their son in Africa, a story that hit close to home for her since she had been on mission trips there, which I suspect was found out through looking at her social media. The scammer likely used that personal connection to try to make the story believable, hoping she wouldn’t question it. Luckily, she sensed something wasn’t right when they asked for money to cover shipping and backed out just in time.

Then there are romance scams which can be even more painful. In my hometown, a woman flew to the UK to meet a man she thought she had been in an online relationship with, only to realize he didn’t exist. Before she even made the trip, she had already sent him money, believing he needed it for his flight. Scammers in these situations spend months building trust before asking for financial help, making it harder for the victim to realize what’s happening until it’s too late.

The key to avoiding these situations is understanding how scammers operate. A great way to do that is by learning from two concepts: Pre-Incident Indicators (PINS) from The Gift of Fear by Gavin de Becker and the OODA loop developed by military strategist Col. John Boyd. De Becker emphasizes the importance of trusting your gut—our instincts are designed to protect us, but too often we ignore them. If something feels off, don’t rationalize it away, it’s probably off. Recognizing the early PINS, like someone pushing for urgency or refusing to take “no” for an answer, can help you catch a scam before it goes too far.

The OODA loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act—helps you take control of a situation by slowing things down. Scammers want you to feel rushed, so you don’t have time to think critically. The loop allows you to step back, assess the situation, and decide on the best course of action without being pressured into a decision.

The bottom line is this: scammers rely on confusion, emotional manipulation, and most importantly speed to achieve their objective. The more you can recognize their tactics, the better able you’ll be to avoid falling into their traps. If something feels wrong, trust yourself and take the time to verify the details.

Christian Brose's The Kill Chain fits into John Robb's Brave New War worldview through a shared recognition of how modern warfare is increasingly defined by technology, decentralization, and the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. Both authors articulate how traditional military doctrines and approaches are becoming obsolete in the face of rapidly evolving threats that leverage technology and asymmetric tactics.

In The Kill Chain, Brose emphasizes that the U.S. military must transition from an outdated model of warfare, which relies on heavy, centralized, and hierarchical systems, to one that is networked, decentralized, and automated. This is in direct alignment with Robb’s view of modern conflict, where networked actors—whether state or non-state—exploit the interconnectedness of global systems to disrupt, degrade, and destabilize powerful adversaries. Robb describes how global guerrillas use these networks to operate in small, autonomous groups, bypassing traditional state hierarchies to attack vulnerable infrastructure.

Brose and Robb both argue that the future of conflict is not about large, conventional forces clashing head-on. Instead, it’s about how fast and effectively forces can operate within a distributed, digital network that connects sensors, decision-makers, and weapons systems. Brose’s kill chain is a system designed to integrate these capabilities at speed, while Robb’s global guerrillas are adept at targeting the weak links in such systems to bring them down.

From Robb’s worldview, the ability of non-state actors and smaller forces to act quickly, adaptively, and asymmetrically is key. Brose, too, is concerned with the speed of decision-making and action in military operations. He emphasizes the need to automate parts of the kill chain with AI and autonomous systems to match the speed of modern threats, which aligns with Robb’s emphasis on networked, fast-moving actors who can outmaneuver larger, slower bureaucratic systems.

Robb’s systems disruption theory is central to Brave New War. It argues that future wars will be less about physical destruction and more about disrupting the complex, interconnected systems that modern states and societies depend on. In Robb’s view, global guerrillas don’t need to defeat a state militarily; they only need to disrupt the systems that allow the state to function i.e. power grids, communication networks, and financial systems. This strategy of targeting critical infrastructure with minimal resources is designed to create cascading failures, causing widespread chaos and undermining state power.

The Kill Chain echoes this vulnerability. Brose argues that the U.S. military’s overreliance on large, centralized systems, such as aircraft carriers and advanced fighter jets—makes it highly susceptible to disruption. Adversaries like China and Russia have focused on developing systems designed to disable or disrupt these legacy platforms by attacking their command-and-control infrastructure, sensors, and communications; the kinds of targets Robb’s global guerrillas would aim for in a conflict.

Both Brose and Robb emphasize the growing importance of cyber warfare as the key tool for systems disruption. For Robb, cyberattacks are the ultimate non-kinetic fires ( a term that suck with me after reading The Kill Chain) or a way for small, decentralized actors to create massive effects on a technologically advanced adversary by attacking the digital infrastructure that underpins its military and civilian systems. Brose describes how adversaries can exploit U.S. military vulnerabilities with cyberattacks, jamming sensors, blinding satellites, or injecting false data into decision-making systems, effectively breaking the kill chain before it can even begin.

Robb’s Brave New War is built around the idea of asymmetric warfare, where smaller, less powerful actors can challenge larger states by using unconventional tactics and low-cost, high-impact attacks. He also introduces the concept of open-source warfare, where tactics, techniques, and technologies are shared across decentralized networks of non-state actors, enabling them to rapidly innovate and adapt.

Brose’s The Kill Chain acknowledges this asymmetric threat but from the perspective of state-on-state conflict. He describes how China and Russia, instead of trying to match the U.S. militarily with traditional platforms, have adopted asymmetric strategies that focus on neutralizing America’s strengths. These adversaries invest in capabilities designed to disable U.S. power projection by attacking weak points in its command-and-control infrastructure, electronic warfare, and space-based assets. Brose’s warnings about this shift align with Robb’s vision of how smaller or less-resourced actors can use asymmetric tactics to outmaneuver and disrupt a more powerful adversary.

Additionally, Robb’s idea of open-source insurgency ties directly into the nature of cyber warfare, which Brose sees as critical in future conflicts. In Robb’s framework, tools for systems disruption, like cyber exploits, can be shared across a global network of actors, allowing even small groups to gain access to powerful technologies that can cripple a state’s infrastructure. Brose’s analysis echoes this by highlighting how easily cyber tools can be developed or acquired by both state and non-state actors, further amplifying the asymmetric potential of modern warfare.

Both Robb and Brose agree that the U.S. military must adapt if it hopes to remain competitive in the future of warfare. For Brose, this means breaking away from the obsession with legacy systems like aircraft carriers and embracing new technologies like artificial intelligence, automation, and space-based surveillance. He advocates for the U.S. military to move towards a distributed, networked system of warfare where the kill chain is automated and decisions are made at machine speed.

Robb’s prescription for surviving in this new environment is similar. He advocates for a more resilient, decentralized system, where the state adopts the same kind of adaptive, networked thinking that its adversaries use. For both authors, the future is about speed, agility, and flexibility, not overwhelming firepower or centralized control. In Robb’s world, the state that can out-think and out-adapt its adversaries will survive, while the one that clings to legacy platforms will be left vulnerable to systems disruption and decentralized attacks.

In Robb’s framework, non-state actors like global guerrillas use open-source tactics and systems disruption to paralyze more powerful adversaries, a strategy that is echoed in Brose’s analysis of how China and Russia are developing asymmetric capabilities to disable the U.S. military’s kill chain. Both authors warn that the future of warfare will be determined not by who has the most firepower, but by who can best adapt to the challenges of this networked, decentralized, and technology-driven world.

Recently, I finished this book on the way to WWHF. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare by Christian Brose is an examination of the United States’ military vulnerabilities in the face of rapid technological advancements and the shifting nature of modern warfare.

Brose, who served as the staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee and as a senior advisor to Senator John McCain, leverages his insider perspective to offer a sobering critique of how the U.S. military is failing to adapt to the challenges of a new era defined by AI, automation, and cyber capabilities.

The “kill chain” concept refers to the sequence of detecting a threat, deciding on a response, and taking action to neutralize it. Traditionally, this process involved human decision-makers at each stage, but modern warfare demands faster, more automated processes. Brose argues that America's military kill chain is slow, centralized, and heavily reliant on legacy systems that are vulnerable to disruption.

The Kill Chain contends that the United States is locked into an outdated model of warfare, one that emphasizes traditional platforms like aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and tanks. These systems, Brose argues, belong to an era of industrial-age warfare that is quickly becoming obsolete in the face of information-age threats. Today’s conflicts are increasingly defined by “data, sensors, autonomous systems,” and the ability to leverage these technologies to achieve real-time decision-making and action; essentially, how quickly and effectively a military can complete its “kill chain.”

Brose paints a stark picture of how adversaries like China have studied the U.S. military's strengths and weaknesses and developed strategies to counter them. Rather than attempting to match the United States platform for platform, China has focused on developing capabilities that can exploit the vulnerabilities of America's complex, interconnected military systems. These capabilities include advanced cyberwarfare tools, electronic warfare systems, and precision-guided missile technology designed to target the weak links in America's kill chain.

The book explores how China’s investment in these areas is part of a broader strategy to neutralize America’s advantages. China has invested in anti-ship ballistic missiles that can target U.S. aircraft carriers, developed advanced electronic warfare capabilities that can jam or blind U.S. surveillance systems, and built extensive cyber capabilities to compromise American military networks. These developments challenge the dominance of the U.S. military, as they can render its traditional platforms ineffective before they can even enter the battlefield.

Brose makes the case that the United States is at risk of losing its strategic edge because it has not adequately adapted to this shift. The U.S. military's focus on maintaining and expanding expensive legacy systems leaves it poorly positioned to counter adversaries who are innovating more rapidly and adopting strategies that focus on disrupting America’s ability to respond effectively.

The Kill Chain does not shy away from critiquing the entrenched bureaucracy of the Pentagon and the defense-industrial complex. Brose highlights how the procurement process is bogged down by inefficiency, resistance to change, and an obsession with maintaining traditional platforms. He argues that this mentality has led to a situation where the U.S. spends billions on legacy systems that may never be effective in a future conflict.

Brose is particularly critical of the U.S. defense budget's emphasis on sustaining existing programs rather than investing in new technologies. He contrasts this with China’s approach, where the focus is on developing capabilities that can counter the United States’ strengths and exploit its weaknesses. This difference in strategic thinking, Brose suggests, has created a scenario where the U.S. could be outmaneuvered in a future conflict, not because it lacks resources, but because it has failed to innovate and adapt.

One of the more urgent messages in The Kill Chain is the need for the United States to integrate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and autonomous systems into its military strategy. Brose argues that these technologies are not just enhancements to existing capabilities but are the keys to unlocking a new model of warfare where decisions can be made at machine speed.

In a world where threats emerge and change rapidly, relying on human decision-making in the kill chain can be a fatal flaw. Brose envisions a future where AI-enabled systems can identify, track, and prioritize threats autonomously, with human oversight serving as a guide rather than the primary decision-maker. This shift would enable the military to operate faster and more efficiently, adapting to threats in real-time rather than relying on slow, hierarchical chains of command.

Brose highlights that the private sector is already leading in many of these areas, with companies like SpaceX and Palantir driving advancements in AI, space-based surveillance, and data analysis. He advocates for greater collaboration between the Department of Defense and these innovative private companies, arguing that such partnerships are essential if the U.S. military is to harness cutting-edge technology and maintain its competitive edge.

Brose argues that America must embrace a new way of thinking about warfare—one that prioritizes speed, agility, and the ability to operate across a distributed, networked battlefield. This requires a willingness to take risks, to abandon the comfort of legacy platforms, and to invest in technologies that can make the military more effective in an era of information warfare.

He also emphasizes that the future of warfare will not be won by having more tanks or aircraft carriers but by building systems that can see, think, and act faster than those of adversaries. This means focusing on developing the infrastructure for autonomous drones, space-based sensors, and AI-driven analysis tools that can turn data into action in milliseconds